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In t h i s paper I s h a l l t r y to give a survey of the connections be-
tween i n t e n s i o n a l semantics and semantics f o r n a t u r a l languages, i . 
e. between a l o g i c a l and a l i n g u i s t i c d i s c i p l i n e . Since these 
connections are the r e s u l t of a long and s t i l l very ac t i v e develop-
ment, t h i s survey can only be concerned with the general o u t l i n e s 
and so i s not p r i m a r i l y adressed to the s p e c i a l i s t s i n the f i e l d . 
When I was asked to^give such a survey I accepted the o f f e r as an 
opportunity to make a l i t t l e b i t of propaganda among l o g i c i a n s , whose 
i n t e r e s t i s concentrated on mathematics, f o r another promising f i e l d 
of a p p l i c a t i o n of l o g i c that may i n the future become equally im-
portant as that of mathematics. 
I 
F i r s t l e t me b r i e f l y sketch the development i n t h e o r e t i c a l l i n g u i s t i c s 
that has been leading up to today's close cooperation with l o g i c . 
Logic f i r s t gained influence i n l i n g u i s t i c s when i t s standards of 
preciseness f o r the s y n t a c t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n of languages were taken 
over by l i n g u i s t s . I t i s , among others, the merit of Y . B a r - H i l l e l 
and of N.Chomsky to have f i r m l y implanted t h i s idea i n modern 
grammar. Modern l o g i c from i t s beginning - e s s e n t i a l l y since Frege 1s 
" B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t " ( 1879) - has been using a r t i f i c i a l languages that 
are s y n t a c t i c a l l y and, since Ta r s k i 1 s paper on the concept of t r u t h 
of 1951, also semantically b u i l t up i n a rigorous manner. The, so to 
speak, i d e a l i z e d experimental conditions under which such a r t i f i c i a l 
languages are constructed allow an exactness of t h e i r grammatical 
r u l e s and therefore of l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s that contrasts very po-
s i t i v e l y with the vague concepts and the a s s e r t i o n s of doubtful 
g e n e r a l i t y i n t r a d i t i o n a l grammar. C l e a r l y n a t u r a l languages, e v o l -
v i n g from long h i s t o r i c a l developments are much more complex and 
d i f f i c u l t to describe by exact r u l e s than constructed languages. 
But i f the property of well-formedness of the sentences of a n a t u r a l 
language L i s decidable, as i t should be as a p r e c o n d i t i o n to them 
being e a s i l y understandable, then on Church's t h e s i s on the mathe-
ma t i c a l d e f i n a b i l i t y of the concept of d e c i d a b i l i t y and i n view of 
the development of general systems f o r generating decidable sets of 
expressions i n metamathematics, there must be such systems f o r gene-
r a t i n g the sentences of L. Generative grammar mostly uses Semi-Thue-
systems. I f "S" ( f o r "sentence"), "NP" ( f o r "noun phrase"), "VP" 
( f o r "verb phrase"), "A" ( f o r " a r t i c l e " ) , "N" ( f o r "noun"), "VT" 
( f o r " t r a n s i t i v e v e r b " ) , e t c . are (grammatical) symbols, and the 
expressions from the l e x i c o n of L provide the termi n a l vocabulary, 
the well-formed sentences of L can ( i n a f i r s t approximation) be des-
c r i b e d as the expressions de r i v a b l e from the symbol S by a p p l i c a t i o n s 
of the r u l e s of the system. These r u l e s are of the form X*X->XtY, 
where * i s a grammatical symbol and T such a symbol or a termi n a l 
expression. We obtain f o r instance t h i s d e r i v a t i o n of the sentence 
"The man h i t s the dog": 
NP VP 
N VT NP 
A N 
The man h i t s the dog 
This model has the advantage of being f a m i l i a r f o r l i n g u i s t s : the 
sentences of a language are analysed i n t o a l i n e a r l y concatenated 
sequence of c o n s t i t u e n t s and t h i s parsing operation can be performed 
at various l e v e l s of g e n e r a l i t y to y i e l d a h i e r a r c h i c a l branching-
diagram. 
There are many complications inv o l v e d i n t h i s grammatical model 
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that I s h a l l not discuss here. Let me ju s t say that the end-expressions 
of such d e r i v a t i o n s represent only the deep-structure of the sen-
tences of L which i n many cases do not coincide with t h e i r sur-
face s t r u c t u r e , i . e . t h e i r normal form, which then has to be derived 
from i t s deep structure by transformation r u l e s which rearrange the 
expressions, take care of congruence, mode, number etc. 
But even i f you count the theory of Semi-Thue-Systems as a l o g i c a l 
theory, t h i s i s not a s y n t a c t i c a l a n a l y s i s of the sentences of L that 
could be termed " l o g i c a l " , since i t i s based on the categories "verb 
phrase" etc. of t r a d i t i o n a l grammar. So t h i s was a step i n the r i g h t 
d i r e c t i o n but i t d i d not carry very f a r . 
The f i r s t attempt at a generative semantics as made by Fodor and Katz 
i n (63) was even l e s s sucessful. They t r i e d to coordinate semantical 
r u l e s to the s y n t a c t i c a l ones, but since the basic type of t h e i r 
p r o j e c t i o n r u l e s was only that of forming a conjunction of one-place 
a t t r i b u t e s , t h i s attempt ended i n f a i l u r e . 
The f a i l u r e , however, of these projects to integrate l o g i c a l ideas 
i n t o the framework of t r a d i t i o n a l grammar cleared the way to l i n -
g u i s t i c analyses that are l o g i c a l i n a deeper sense. The idea seemed 
more and more a t t r a c t i v e to depart from the categories of t r a d i t i o n a l 
grammar and use l o g i c a l categories instead, as developed by K. 
Ajdukiewicz, St. Lesniewski, Y. B a r - H i l l e l , H.B. Curry and others, 
and to represent the deep-structure of the sentences by formulae of 
a l o g i c a l language. S y n t a c t i c a l l y t h i s idea was not very r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
since the complications of natura l languages were already deferred 
to the transformational part of the grammar, which now could be l e f t 
e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged. The only s y n t a c t i c a l problem was not to make 
the deep structure too d i f f e r e n t from the surface structure of a 
sentence which i t w i l l be i f the usual l o g i c a l representation i s used. 
Semantics, however, at f i r s t presented the d i f f i c u l t y that na-
t u r a l languages are f u l l of non-extensional contexts, while l o g i c , 
t i l l about 15 years ago, had only extensional semantics to o f f e r and 
then t i l l about the end of the s i x t i e s only i n t e n s i o n a l semantics 
f o r elementary types of language. 
I I 
W.V.Quine i n h i s paper "The Problem of Meaning i n L i n g u i s t i c s " 
(51) and i n other papers since has argued t h a t , while the theory of 
reference, i . e . of the extensions of expressions, i s , thanks to the 
work of Ta r s k i and others, a sound and rigorous d i s c i p l i n e , the 
theory of meaning i s s t i l l i n a desolate state since i t has not 
even "been able to define i t s b a s i c notions, as those of p r o p o s i t i o n , 
a t t r i b u t e , synonymity, a n a l y t i c i t y e t c . Neither, according to Quine, 
was i t ever l i k e l y to a t t a i n the state of a sound d i s c i p l i n e since 
these concepts cannot be r i g o r o u s l y defined. To vary a Wittgensteinean 
dictum, Quine thought that a l l that can be sa i d c l e a r l y can be sai d 
i n an extensional language, and whereof we cannot speak c l e a r l y , 
we should be s i l e n t . 
In h i s "Meaning and Necessity" (4 -7) , however, R.Carnap had a l -
ready shown the way to a rigorous d e f i n i t i o n of these concepts i n 
the same s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l framework extensional semantics uses. 
His idea was roughly t h i s : I f we know the meaning of a sentence A, 
then we know under which conditions i t i s tr u e . We can express t h i s 
by saying: I f we know the meaning of A we know i n which p o s s i b l e 
worlds i t i s t r u e . The i n v e r s i o n of t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s not so obvious: 
Do we know the meaning of a sentence i f we know under which condi-
t i o n s i t would be true? But we can at l e a s t define a concept of 
i n t e n s i o n as a f i r s t approximation to that of meaning by p o s t u l a t i n g 
that t h i s i n v e r s i o n holds. Then we have f o r two sentences A and B: 
The i n t e n s i o n of A i s i d e n t i c a l with that of B i f f they have the 
same t r u t h value i n a l l p o s s i b l e worlds. 
And we can define the i n t e n s i o n of A by a b s t r a c t i o n to be that 
f u n c t i o n f, s. t. f o r every world i f ( i ) i s the t r u t h value of 
A i n i . 
This can be generalized f o r other types of expressions: The i n t e n -
s i o n of an expression E i s that f u n c t i o n which assigns to every 
world i the extension of E i n i . 
A ( p o s s i b l e ) world i s no d i s t a n t cosmos on whose existence we 
speculate, but, as our world can be defined, according to Wittgen-
s t e i n , as the set of a l l f a c t s , a ( p o s s i b l e ) world can be defined 
as a set of p r o p o s i t i o n s that i s consistent and maximal, i . e . as 
a "complete novel." 
As two l o g i c a l l y equvalent sentences l i k e "2+2=4" and "dx /dx= 
2x" have i d e n t i c a l i n t e n s i o n s but d i f f e r e n t meanings - meanings 
are to be defined so that two expressions, that are i d e n t i c a l i n 
meaning, may be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r each other i n a l l contexts salva 
v e r i t a t e - in t e n s i o n s are but approximations to meanings. They are, 
however, good approximations since i t i s p o s s i b l e , as we s h a l l see, 
to define meanings with the help of i n t e n s i o n s . 
I I I 
Carnap's ideas were f i r s t put to use i n modal l o g i c by S.Kripke 
and others, although with a s l i g h t m odification of the basic idea: 
instead of sets of worlds they used sets of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The 
language L i s that of p r o p o s i t i o n a l or of f i r s t - o r d e r predicate 
l o g i c with an a d d i t i o n a l s e n t e n t i a l operator N f o r necessity, and 
a model of L i s a set of functions $ i i e l that have the p r o p e r t i e s 
of the usual extensional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s while * i(NA) depends not 
only on * i ( A ) but also on the values *j(A) with j * i . A model f o r 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l modal l o g i c f o r instance i s a t r i p l e <I,S,$>, so that 
a) I i s a non-empty set of worlds (or of indices f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ) . 
b) For a l l i e l S i i s a subset of I with ieS. 
c) For a l l i e l * i i s a function from the set of sentences i n t o the 
set | t , f | of truth-values so that 
d ) $^ s a t i s f i e s the conditions f o r extensional p r o p o s i t i o n a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , a n d 
c2) $ ±(NA)=t i f f S^U] , 
where LA] i s the set i j e l : * .(A)=t| of A-worlds. 
Such i n t e n s i o n a l models made i t possible f o r the f i r s t time to 
define the formal p r o p e r t i e s of the i n t u i t i v e notions of necessity 
exa c t l y and to prove the soundness and completeness of systems of 
modal l o g i c s with respect to such notions. Up to Kripke's work there 
was a host of competing axiomatic systems of modal l o g i c , while no-
body could j u s t i f y h i s i n t u i t i o n that h i s axioms should make up an 
adequate system, nor say how h i s notion of necessity compared with 
others. 
There has been a l o t of f r u i t f u l research i n modal l o g i c i n the 
wider sense since, i n c l u d i n g f o r instance deontic, epistemic and 
c o n d i t i o n a l l o g i c . Instead of sets S i f a m i l i e s of sets or f a m i l i e s 
of sets of sets were used. But a l l t h i s did not give the general 
framework f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s sort of semantics to n a t u r a l 
languages. What was needed was a r i c h e r language than that of 
f i r s t - o r d e r predicate l o g i c , and a simple and general c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n 
f o r the d i f f e r e n t types of i n t e n s i o n a l functors. 
IV 
This was provided at the end of the s i x t i e s i n several papers, 
foremost i n R.Montague's "Universal Grammar" ( 7 0 ) . Let me b r i e f l y 
sketch h i s language, c a l l i t M, i n an extensional and an i n t e n s i o n a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , so that we get a b e t t e r notion of what i n t e n s i o n a l 
semantics i s l i k e . 
F i r s t we define c a t e g o r i e s : 
a) 0 and v are categories (of sentences and proper names). 
b) I f T and p are categories, T ( P ) i s a category (of functors 
which applied to expressions of category p produce expressions 
of category T ) . 
M i s to contain the symbols X ( f o r f u n c t i o n a l a b s t r a c t i o n ) , s ( f o r 
i d e n t i t y ) , brackets and an i n f i n i t e supply of constants and v a r i a b l e s 
f o r each category. 
The well-formed expressions of M are c a l l e d terms of M: 
Pgj. a) A l l constants of M of category T are terms of category T # 
b) I f F i s a term of category T (p) and t a term of category p 
F ( t ) i s a term of category T # 
c) I f A[b] i s a term of category T and b a constant and x a 
v a r i a b l e (not occuring i n A[b])of category p, then XxA[x] 
i s a term of category T ( P ) . 
d) I f s and t are terms of the same category, (s=t) i s a term of 
category a. 
For the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M we f i r s t define the sets of p o s s i b l e 
extensions of terms of category T r e l a t i v e to the universe of d i s -
course U: 
E T ( P ) , U = E T , u P ^ 
where A i s the set of functions from B i n t o A. 
An extensional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M over U i s a f u n c t i o n $ such 
that 
a) *(a) e E T JJ f o r a l l constants a of category T. 
b) * ( F ( t ) ) - % ( E ) ( * ( t ) ) . 
c) $(XxA[x]) i s that f u n c t i o n f e E T ^ ^ y so that f o r a l l *' with 
f ( * ' ( b ) ) = $'(A[b]) (where the constant b does not occur 
i n XxA[x] and $' g $ says that *' and * coincide w i t h the 
p o s s i b l e exception of the values $(b), $'(b)). 
d) * ( s ^ t ) =t i f f *(s) = »(t). 
H i s a t y p e - t h e o r e t i c a l language with predicates t r e a t e d as t r u t h -
-value functions as Frege proposed i n "Funktion und B e g r i f f " 
(1891) and two and more-place functions t r e a t e d as one-place 
functions as i n combinatory l o g i c . As T a r s k i has shown we can define 
the usual l o g i c a l operators, -n,A,A,e i n M. 
Intensional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of M may then he defined thus: 
We supplement the alphabet of M by two new symbols M and 6. jut i s 
to be an expression whose extension i s the i n t e n s i o n of t . fit occur-
r i n g instead of t s i g n i f i e s that t stands i n an i n d i r e c t or non-
extensional context, where i t s extension, according to Frege, i s 
i t s usual i n t e n s i o n . We need then new categories f o r such expressions 
and incorporate i n t o D1 the condition: 
Die} I f T i s a category then I(T) i s a category (of expressions of 
the form p.t). 
and i n t o D3 the d e f i n i t i o n 
E t ( T ) , U = ET,U * 
so that extensions of expressions of category I ( T ) are intensions of 
expressions of category T. 
6 i s to be an operator such that 6|at 2 t . D2 i s then supplemented 
by two s t i p u l a t i o n s : 
c) I f t i s a term of category T, pt i s a term of category I ( T ) . 
f ) I f t i s a term of category I ( T ) , 6t i s a term of category T. 
P5i An i n t e n s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M over U and I (a non-empty set 
of worlds) i s a f u n c t i o n * such that f o r a l l i e l : 
a) $^ s a t i s f i e s the conditions f o r extensional i n t e r p e t a t i o n s of M 
over U according to D4. 
b) *.(|at) = X * j $ . ( t ) (where X* i s a m e t a l i n g u i s t i c symbol f o r f u n c t i o -
n a l a b s t r a c t i o n ) . 
c) ^ ( f c a ) = * i ( a ) ( i ) . 
Condition (c) of now i s to be modified so that i s an i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n with *! (b) = *!;(b) f o r a l l We want to quantify over 
Ep and since there are more functions i n E^ ^ than objects of 
E jT, and since *! (A[b] ) may depend on values *'.(b) f o r j=fi, we must 
r e s t r i c t the a's accordingly. I f $j(A[b]) does not depend on values 
<K(b) f o r j + i , then the nature of the r e s t r i c t i o n does not matter; 
i f i t does, then XxA[x] may make no sense - that was Quine' s argument 
against q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o modal contexts - and i n that case again any 
r e s t r i c t i o n w i l l do. I f we i n t e r p r e t i n d i v i d u a l constants b as 
standard names , however, so that ^ ( a ) = * j ( a ) f o r a l l j e l - and 
S.Kripke has given good reasons f o r that i n "Naming and Necessity" 
(72) - then q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over i n d i v i d u a l s i n t o modal contexts 
makes sense, the same sense as our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of expressions of 
the form XxA[x]. 
A word may be i n order on the much discussed problem whether a l l 
the worlds i n I should contain the same i n d i v i d u a l s , as we have 
s t i p u l a t e d , f o l l o w i n g Montague, or not, and how t r a n s w o r l d - i d e n t i t y 
i s to be understood, or i f there can only be correspondences, counter-
p a r t - r e l a t i o n s as D.Lewis suggests i n ( 6 8 ) e.g. but no i d e n t i t i e s . 
F i r s t the objects i n U are to be p o s s i b l e objects. For each i d 
we may introduce sets I^cU of objects e x i s t i n g i n i and these sets 
may be d i f f e r e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t i f s . I f E i s a constant of category 
o(v) and *^(E)»U^ we may define q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over e x i s t i n g instead 
of p o s s i b l e objects i n the manner of Free Logic by A.xA[x] :=AX(E(X) 
3 A [ x ] ) . Second we can take the i d e n t i t y of objects as a b a s i c notion 
that need not be defined f o r each world by the L e i b n i z - p r i n c i p l e 
of coincidence of p r o p e r t i e s , or f o r d i f f e r e n t worlds by a r e s t r i c t e d 
L e i b n i z - p r i n c i p l e of coincidence of " e s s e n t i a l " p r o p e r t i e s or some-
t h i n g of that s o r t . Introducing c o u n t e r p a r t - r e l a t i o n s i n the sense of 
Lewis c e r t a i n l y makes f o r higher g e n e r a l i t y , but I know of no cases 
where t h i s increase i n g e n e r a l i t y i s f r u i t f u l and therefore I p r e f e r 
s i m p l i c i t y . 
Since non-extensional contexts are very frequent i n n a t u r a l languages 
the use of the v-operator i s somewhat tedious. Therefore we might 
e i t h e r t r e a t a l l functors as c o r r e l a t i n g extensions to i n t e n s i o n s , 
or a s s i g n i n t e n s i o n s to the expressions d i r e c t l y . But as we want to 
d i s t i n g u i s h , f o r instance, between q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over extensions and 
that over i n t e n s i o n s , between q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over i n d i v i d u a l s and 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over i n d i v i d u a l concepts, we have to mark the d i f f e r e n c e 
s y n t a c t i c a l l y i n any way so that we cannot hope to get o f f much 
cheaper by such approaches than i n languages of the Montague-type. 
IV 
I f L i s a n a t u r a l language and M an i n t e r p r e t e d Montague-language 
then a l o g i c a l grammar f o r L i s defined by an analysing r e l a t i o n 
R(A,B) on T(M) x T ( L ) , where T(M) i s the set of wellform ed expressions 
of M and T(L) t h i s set f o r L, such that 
1) For a l l BeT(L) there i s an A with R(A,B). 
2) I f R(A,B) then the meaning of A i s a p o s s i b l e meaning of B. 
I f R(A,B), A i s c a l l e d an analysing expression f o r B. 
I f R i s e x p l i c i t l y defined, a l l e s s e n t i a l grammatical concepts 
f o r L can be defined from t h i s r e l a t i o n . 
I f R(A,B), then the expression A represents the deep-structure 
of B with constants of M i n place of words or morphemes of L. There 
i s no need now to supply analyses of deep-structures i n the form of 
t h e i r d e r i v a t i o n s , since the structure of the terms of M i s unambi-
guous, R may be taken to contain the r u l e s of s u b s t i t u t i o n of the 
terminal vocabulary of L f o r grammatical symbols i n Generative Grammar 
as w e l l as i t s transformational part. 
V 
Analysing r e l a t i o n s have been given only f o r ve^y small fragments 
of n a t u r a l languages. There are numerous d i f f i c u l t i e s to overcome 
i f they are to be defined f o r l a r g e r and more i n t e r e s t i n g parts of 
language. I s h a l l only mention some to convey an impression of the 
complexity of a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of natural language: 
1) F i r s t there i s the s y n t a c t i c a l problem that l o g i c a l deep s t r u c t u r e , 
i . e . the structure of the terms of M, i s often very d i f f e r e n t from 
the surface structure of the terms of L. This makes f o r very compli-
cated transformations, and therefore i s an inventive to change the 
usual l o g i c a l representation. Take the f o l l o w i n g two examples: 
a) Q u a n t i f i e r s l i k e "everybody", "somebody", "nobody" are t r e a t e d 
i n E n g l i s h l i k e proper names i n the sentences Joe sings, Everybody 
sings, Nobody sings. Instead of representing those sentences i n the 
usual form G(a), AxG(x) and-iVxG(x), there have been attempts there-
f o r e , to a s s i m i l a t e proper names to q u a n t i f i e r s by t r e a t i n g them as 
functors of category o ( a ( v ) ) , or by t r e a t i n g q u a n t i f i e r s ("a man", 
" a l l men", "no man"), as w e l l as proper names, as names f o r bundels 
of p r o p e r t i e s (the "universal-generic man" having those pr o p e r t i e s 
that a l l men have, the " e x i s t e n t i a l - g e n e r i c man" having the p r o p e r t i e s 
that some man has e t c . ) . Cf. Lewis ( 7 0 ) , e.g. 
b) In the German sentences 
a ) F r i t z singt l a u t ( F r i t z sings loudly) 
ß) F r i t z singt gern ( F r i t z l i k e s to sing) 
v) F r i t z singt wahrscheinlich (Probably F r i t z sings) 
the adverbs have the same function i n surface structure though 
l o g i c a l l y they are to be treated quite d i f f e r e n t l y : "wahrscheinlich" 
i s a p p l i e d to the p r o p o s i t i o n that F r i t z sings, " l a u t " charac-
t e r i z e s the verb, and "gern" has i t s e l f the function of a verb, as 
becomes apparent i n the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s . The usual l o g i c a l 
representations of the three sentences would look something l i k e t h i s 
V f ( S ( f ) A f ( a ) A L ( f ) ) ("There i s an a c t i o n of singing that F r i t z 
performs and that has the property of being loud"), F(a,g), and P ( f ( a ) ) . 
" s i n g t " occurs i n ( a ) as a 2nd-order predicate, i n (ß) and ( Y ) as a 
1st-order predicate. 
These two examples show that we should look f o r non-standard l o g i c a l 
r epresentations of ordinary language sentences c l o s e r to t h e i r syn-
t a c t i c a l s t r u c t u r e • 
2) Generally speaking, there i s a v a r i a b i l i t y and p l a s t i c i t y of the 
terms of n a t u r a l languages quite u n p a r a l l e l e d i n l o g i c . The same term 
of L o f t e n has to be coordinated by the analyzing r e l a t i o n R to many 
c a t e g o r i a l l y and semantically d i f f e r e n t terms of M. The task of 
g e t t i n g along with a minimum of morphemes without ending up with 
ambiguity i n too many cases i s solved much b e t t e r by n a t u r a l languages, 
i t seems , than by l o g i c . I t i s quite an i n t e r e s t i n g problem whether 
we could not do b e t t e r i n l o g i c even i f we hold on, as we should, 
to the p r i n c i p l e of unambiguity i n a l l cases. 
3) Besides the s y n t a c t i c a l problems of n a t u r a l language a n a l y s i s 
there are semantic problems which c a l l f o r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s of the 
concept of an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M defined i n D5. While we u s u a l l y 
only consider e t e r n a l sentences i n l o g i c , many sentences of L con-
t a i n index-expressions l i k e " I " , "you'', "here", "now", "yesterday'', 
" t h i s " e t c . , whose extensions vary f o r d i f f e r e n t utterances of the 
same sentence. Therefore extensions and i n t e n s i o n s must be defined 
f o r utterances, i . e . p a i r s (A,j> of a sentence A and an occurrence 
of A. I f I i s a set of n-tuples of parameters, s p e c i f y i n g speaker, 
audience, time, p l a c e , i n d i c a t e d things e t c . , i . e . a set of p o i n t s of 
reference, then we may introduce i n D5 besides i another index j f o r 
$ so that *. .(A) i s the extension, X*i$. .(A) the i n t e n s i o n of the 
utterance <A,j> of A, while X*j$. .(A) i s the extension and X * i j $ . .(A) 
1 } d 1 * d 
the i n t e n s i o n of the sentence A. 
There i s , however, no obvious l i m i t a t i o n of the parameters i n j , 
so that we must perhaps take j as an index f o r a space-time-point 
i n i where A was u t t e r e d , as suggested by D. Lewis i n ( 6 9 ) . The meaning 
of an utterance may depend, f o r instance, on the f a c t s obvious f o r 
speaker and audience i n the s i t u a t i o n of i t s occurrence as i n the 
sentence " I s h a l l now go (which may mean: walk, d r i v e , go by t r a i n , 
f l y ) to Boston". 
4) In ordinary language there are wellformed but meaningless expressions 
as "17 laughs", "The k i n g of Bavaria i s s i t t i n g i n the audience" 
" I f we were a l i v e , we could read t h i s paper", e t c . Most e m p i r i c a l 
p r e d i c a t e s are not defined f o r a l l s y n t a c t i c a l l y admissible argu-
ments and many sentences f o r "being meaningful presuppose that some-
thi n g i s the case which i n fa c t may not be the case at a l l . There-
fore we should, f o l l o w i n g D.Scott i n ( 7 0 ) , define the sets of 
possible extensions f o r the non-basic categories by 
E T ( P ) , U = E T , U ( E ^ U ) A N D E L ( T ) , U = E T , U ( L ) ' 
(B ) 
where A v y i s the set of functions from subsets of B i n t o A. 
5) Besides s y n t a c t i c a l ambiguity (as "F l y i n g planes can be dange-
rous") there i s also semantic ambiguity (as i n "Peter i s going to 
the bank") and pragmatic ambiguity (as i n "The problem I mentioned 
above was f i r s t noted by Quine"). As semantic ambiguity i s often 
eliminated by the context ("Peter i s going to the bank to cash a 
cheque"), we should not represent a l l ambiguous words by d i f f e r e n t 
constants of M. Instead we might assign classes of extensions to 
expressions and formulate the conditions i n D5 thus: 
a) *^(a) e E T T J f o r a l l constants a of category T. 
b) $ i ( F ( t ) ) = ,|veE T^ T J: Vaß(a€^(F) A pc»i(t) A a(ß) = v ) ! . 
c) $^(XxA[x])is that c l a s s of functions feE T ^ ^ ^  such that f o r a l l 
*' with<^fb=:^,$|(b) = i a | and = *|(b) f o r a l l j c l there i s 
a pe*!(A[b]) with f(a)=ß. 
d) $.(s£sf) = iyeE^ TT: Vaß(ac*.(s) A ße*.(s') A (a=ß A Y=t.v.a4ß A 
Y = f ))}. 
e) * ±(Mt) = i f e I T n : A j V a ( a e ^ ( t ) A f ( j ) = a ) | . 
Then an expression t i s unambiguous i n i i f f * ^ ( t ) i s a u n i t - c l a s s . 
We may then also abandon p a r t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as considered 
f E ^ 
under ( 4), since we can represent a function f = *^(F) eE T ^ p ,Ir 
which i s defined on the subset E'eE T T by the set of functions from E ' E p,U c o i n c i d i n g on E' with f. 
T,U 
6) Not a l l d i f f e r e n c e s i n meaning can be represented by di f f e r e n c e s 
i n i n t e n s i o n . The two sentences "Jack b e l i e v e s , that 2+2=4" and "Jack 
b e l i e v e s , that dx 2/dx = 2x" may have d i f f e r e n t truth-values though 
"2+2=4" and "dx 2/dx = 2x" have the same intensions, as we saw. 
There i s one approach to meaning, f i r s t taken by S.Kripke i n h i s 
completeness proofs f o r the modal systems S1, S2 and S3, envisaging 
abnormal worlds i n which not a l l l o g i c a l l y true sentences hold. 
This has the advantage of formal s i m p l i c i t y but there i s no way 
of determining what sort of absurd worlds we should assume to 
account f o r the l o g i c a l i n c a p a b i l i t i e s of a l l p o s s i b l e people i n a l l 
our p o s s i b l e worlds. 
Another approach i s t h i s : We introduce i n d i c e s keK f o r the terms 
of M. Let k(A) be the index of the term A. Then we define *. v as 
i n D5 and introduce an operator K such that * i k ( n t ) = X * i * i j c ( ^ ) ( t ) . 
This way we assign a term t an i n t e n s i o n f o r every context A, r e -
presented by k(A) , i n which i t occurs. 
v can, f o r instance, be defined so that *. , (KS) = §. , (nt) i f f 
t i s obtained from s by s u b s t i t u t i n g constants with the same i n t e n -
sion s . Then t h i s concept of meaning coincides w i t h Carnap's notion 
of i n t e n s i o n a l isomorphism i n (47). 
7 ) Besides d e s c r i p t i v e sentences n a t u r a l languages also contain 
questions, imperatives, exclamations, guesses, suggestions etc. As 
has been emphasized e s p e c i a l l y by J.L.Austin i n ( 5 5 ) and J.R. Searle 
i n ( 7 0 ) a semantics of n a t u r a l language has also to account f o r these 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y modes of sentences or utterances. 
We may, however, assign the question "Is Tom coming?", adressed by 
John to Jack the ( d e s c r i p t i v e ) meaning of the a s s e r t i o n "John asks 
Jack, whether Tom i s coming". And the question "Is Tom coming?1', as a 
sentence, can be assigned the ( d e s c r i p t i v e ) meaning of the predicate 
"to ask, whether Tom i s coming". In t h i s way, which i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
i d e n t i c a l with what D.Lewis proposed i n ( 7 0 ) , we can, with the help 
of i l l o c u t i o n a r y verbs l i k e "order", "ask", "promise" e t c . , define 
the semantics f o r other i l l o c u t i o n a r y modes i n the framework of a 
semantics f o r a s s e r t i o n s . 
V 
So the attempt at a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of n a t u r a l languages suggests 
quite a few s y n t a c t i c a l and semantical m o d i f i c a t i o n s of the language 
M. Besides the s p e c i f i c d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n l o g i c a l grammar 
we should also mention some fundamental objections that have been 
r a i s e d against the whole p r o j e c t : 
1) Natural languages are vague i n many respects, s y n t a c t i c a l and 
semantical. Analysing such languages, i t has been s a i d , by assigning 
them exact l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s i s therefore inadequate i n p r i n c i p l e 
since i t p r o j e c t s on them a higher degree of p r e c i s i o n than they 
a c t u a l l y have and i s therefore a m o d i f i c a t i o n r a t h e r than a des-
c r i p t i o n . I t i s not the task of a grammar of a language L to t r a n s -
form L i n t o a p r e c i s e language i n the sense of l o g i c , but to mi r r o r 
f a i t h f u l l y the p r o p e r t i e s L a c t u a l l y has. 
This i s not j u s t the d i f f i c u l t y of how to derive the p r o p e r t i e s of 
L from observations of how L i s used, as D.Lewis suggests i n (69), 
pp.200seq, but L as a n a t u r a l language i t s e l f i s not something 
precise but fuzzy a l l over. Instead of a well-defined c l a s s of 
wellformed expressions there are degrees of grammaticalness; i n -
stead of predicates with well-defined domains there are predicates 
more or l e s s welldefined f o r d i f f e r e n t arguments; instead of a w e l l 
defined c l a s s of possi b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a term t there i s a 
cla s s of more or l e s s possible or natural i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t . 
In view of t h i s John R.Ross i n (73) gave the advice to grammarians 
"You have to get y o u r s e l f t h i n k i n g the fuzzy way!" Now, f o r l o g i c i a n s 
at l e a s t , t h i s cannot mean th i n k i n g the vague or unprecise way, but 
only t h i n k i n g the comparative instead of the c l a s s i f i c a t o r y way.This 
means th a t , a f t e r the more fundamental d i f f i c u l t i e s of l o g i c a l 
grammar are overcome, we should think of de f i n i n g notions l i k e 
"Expression s i s more wellformed than expression t " , " f i s a more 
t y p i c a l (or normal) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t than ft 111 and "s i s l e s s vague 
than t " . In that way we may also define comparative concepts of 
synonymy and a n a l y t i c i t y , as advocated by Quine. I f , j u s t to give an 
example, we have a r e l a t i o n of comparative s i m i l a r i t y of worlds, as 
employed f o r instance by R.Stalnaker i n (68) and D.Lewis i n (73) i n 
t h e i r analyses of c o n d i t i o n a l s , we might say that sentence A i s at 
most as a n a l y t i c a l as B i f f - lA-worlds are at l e a s t as s i m i l a r to the 
r e a l world as - i B-worlds. Such comparative concepts c e r t a i n l y make 
f o r higher complexity, but I see no a p r i o r i reasons why l o g i c should 
not be able to mirror the fuzziness of natural languages t h i s way. 
2) Accounting f o r vagueness i n t h i s way would also solve another 
fundamental problem, pointed out by Quine: The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M -
and i f we analyse a n a t u r a l language L by M also that of L - depends 
on the set I of po s s i b l e worlds. Now we cannot take I to be the set 
of a l l l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e worlds, since the (analysing expressions of 
the) a n a l y t i c sentences of L are to hold i n a l l worlds of I . I f , on 
the other hand, we determine I as the set of worlds i n which a l l 
a n a l y t i c sentences of L hold, then I i s not well-defined since, as 
Quine has convincingly shown, the set of a n a l y t i c sentences i s not 
w e l l defined. There i s no f i r m boundary between a n a l y t i c and 
synthetic t r u t h s , and with a l i t t l e ingenuity you can always think 
of b i z a r r e words, where the v a l i d i t y of supposedly a n a l y t i c s t a t e -
ments becomes doubtful. But i f we admit p a r t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , 
vagueness and a comparative concept of a n a l y t i c i t y , we can take I 
to be the set of a l l l o g i c a l l y possible worlds, 5-dimensional ones 
and those with married bachelors included, "but with the n o n - l o g i c a l 
terms (almost) undefined there. 
3) The most fundamental o b j e c t i o n against i n t e n s i o n a l semantics, at 
l a s t , comes to t h i s : The whole approach of t h i s semantics i s based 
on the r e a l i s t i c i d e a , that we confer extensions, intensions and 
meanings on l i n g u i s t i c expressions by coordinating e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c 
e n t i t i e s , concrete t h i n g s , a t t r i b u t e s , p r o p o s i t i o n s etc. to them. 
That way we can abstract semantics from pragmatics, semantic coor-
d i n a t i o n from the use of the expressions i n accordance with these 
c o r r e l a t i o n s . But t h i s idea has been questioned w i t h , as I b e l i e v e , 
very sound arguments from Peirce onward. The slogan of today's 
Philosophy of Language i s : "The meaning of a word i s determined 
by i t s use". Use, t h e r e f o r e , comes before, not a f t e r meaning, and 
therefore pragmatics, not semantics, i s the fundamental d i s c i p l i n e . 
Though we can c e r t a i n l y d i s t i n g u i s h and i d e n t i f y many p r o p e r t i e s and 
f a c t s without the use of language, a large and important c l a s s of 
concepts and p r o p o s i t i o n s i s defined only with the help of l i n g u i s t i c 
d i s t i n c t i o n s . In t h i s sense Wittgenstein s a i d : "How do I know that 
t h i s c o l o r i s red?" - An answer would be: "I have learned E n g l i s h " 
( ( 5 3 ) , 3 8 1 ) . Semantics, t h e r e f o r e , i s not a theory of c o r r e l a t i o n s of 
words with meanings, defined independently of language, but i t has 
to be based on a theory of l i n g u i s t i c behavior. 
In h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n to "Word and Object" ((60), p.IX) Quine s a i d : 
"Language i s a s o c i a l a r t . In a c q u i r i n g i t we have to depend e n t i r e l y 
on i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y a v a i l a b l e cues as what to say and when. Hence 
there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o l l a t i n g l i n g u i s t i c meanings, unless 
i n terms of men's d i s p o s i t i o n s to respond o v e r t l y to s o c i a l l y obser-
vable s t i m u l a t i o n s . " 
His "hence", however, i s a non s e q u i t u r : Every semantics that i s 
u s e f u l f o r the a n a l y s i s of l i n g u i s t i c phenomena i s thereby p r a c t i c a l l y 
j u s t i f i e d , no matter what t h e o r e t i c a l constructs i t employs, i f i t 
makes no pretense of being able to e x p l a i n the fundamental f a c t s of 
language; t h a t , however, has never been the aim of i n t e n s i o n a l seman-
t i c s . A deeper, p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s of meaning has to s t a r t from 
l i n g u i s t i c conventions i n the sense of D.Lewis i n (69). I t can also 
be shown, how the d e s c r i p t i o n s of meanings i n the framework of i n -
t e n s i o n a l semantics may be based upon d e s c r i p t i o n s of such conven-
t i o n s . But that i s another s t o r y . 
To sum up t h i s b r i e f survey we can say then that i n t e n s i o n a l se-
mantics f o r n a t u r a l languages, though s t i l l f a c i n g a l o t of problems, 
has proved to be a veiy e f f e c t i v e instrument f o r l i n g u i s t i c analyses. 
From a l o g i c a l point of view, on the other hand, i t s i n t e r e s t l i e s 
i n the f a c t that a c l o s e r look at the phenomena of n a t u r a l languages 
i s g i v i n g new stimulations to l o g i c a l developments. 
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